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Schedule 
Thursday, March 22 
 
12:00 Lunch  Welcomes, Intros Crown Quad, Rooms 320 D and E 
 
Plenary I Mainly FDA & IP Crown Quad, FIR Building, Rm 80 (Moot Court Rm) 
1:00 Darnovsky/Obasogie Bioethics v Biopolitics 
1:30 Zettler   Public Health Perspective in FDA 
1:45 Sachs   De-Linking Drug Reimbursement from FDA Approval 
2:00 Heled   Follow-On Biologics – Set up to Fail 
2:15 Rutschman  IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases 
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2:45 Bair   IP’s Lost Einstein’s  
 
3:00 Break 
 
Plenary II Mainly Medicine Crown Quad, FIR Building, Room 80 (Moot Court Room) 
3:30 Sage   De-medicalizing Health Care 
3:45 Konnoth  Medicalization and New Civil Rights  
4:00 Wolitz   States and Drug Prices 
4:15 Vertinsky   Corporations and the Opioid Epidemic 
4:30 Lamkin   Legitimate Medicine in an Era of Consumerism 
4:45 Rogers   Regulating the Dead: From Past to Present 
5:00 Bobinski  Conscience Clauses  
5:15 Grossman  The History of the Struggle for Medical Marijuana Access 
 
6:00 Dinner  Hank’s house – 739 Santa Ynez St. (10 min walk) 
 
Friday, March 23 
 
8:00 Breakfast Crown Quad, “Link” Building, Room 270 (Manning Lounge) 
 
Concurrent IA  Patents  Crown Quad, “Link” Building, Room 270 (Manning Lounge) 
8:30 Dreyfuss/Nicol  Myriad in the US and Australia 
8:45 Bubela   University Patent Litigation 
9:00 Holman   Monoclonals and Written Description 
9:15 Feldman   Evergreening in the Biggest Pharmaceutical Companies 
9:30 Simon   Contextualizing the Information Facilitating Function of Patents 
9:45 Karshtedt  FDA, Patents, and Generics 
 
Concurrent IB  Mainly Medicine Crown Quad, Room 320 D 
8:30 Bloche   Technological Innovation and Clinical Costs 
8:45 Weithorn  Physician Aid in Dying for the Mentally or Psychologically Distressed 
9:00 Casebeer  Normative Considerations of “Identity” in Neurotechnology 
9:30 Griffin   Brain Injury and Technology 
9:15 Parasidis  Whole Exome Sequencing in Military Health 
9:45 Marcon   Injecting Doubt: Naturopaths and Anti-Vaccination 
 
10:00 Break   Crown Quad, “Link” Building, Room 270 (Manning Lounge) 
 
Concurrent IIA  Big Data + Brain              Crown Quad, “Link” Building, Room 270 (Manning Lounge) 
10:30 Ossorio   Regulating Predictive Algorithms in ‘Omics Assays 
10:45 Wolf    Big Data, Research Risks, and State Law 
11:00 Hoffman  Age and Gender Effects on Third Party Punishment 
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11:15 Denno Neuroscience and the Personalization of Criminal Law 
11:30 Nadler Teaching Law and Neuroscience 
11:45 Shen A NeuroLaw Clinic 
Concurrent IIB Reproduction  Crown Quad, Room 320 D 
10:30 Carbone Lawyers’ Role in ART Contracts of Uncertain Enforceability 
10:45 Daar Embryo Mosaicism and ART Practice 
11:00 Fox Sperm Donation Errors and Race  
11:15 Mohapatra Considering Pregnant Women in Maternal/Fetal Surgery 
11:30 Torrance GINA and Edited Genomes 
11:45 Oberman Abortion Law in the 21st Century 
12:00 Lunch Crown Quad, “Link” Building, Room 270 (Manning Lounge) 
Plenary III Mainly Brain Crown Quad, FIR Building, Rm 190 
1:00 Murphy Memory Detection 
1:15 Moriarty Neuroscience Lie Detection 
1:30 Grey Legal Significance of Research Finding Sex Differences in the Brain 
1:45 Ram Forensic Biobanking and Family Searching  
2:00 Seaman Cyberpsychology 
2:15 Bloch Using Virtual Reality to Prevent Prosecutorial Misconduct 
2:30 Drobac Brain Science and the Law of Consent 
2:45 Maurer Synthetic Biologists and the Idea of Self-Governance 
3:00 Break 
Plenary IV Discrim/Datashare Crown Quad, FIR Building, Rm 190 
3:30 Prince 
3:45 
4:00 
4:15 
4:30 
4:45 
Arias  
Wagner  
Sherkow 
Minssen 
Cook-Deegan 
Genetic Anti-Discrimination in Life & Income Replacement Ins 
Alzheimer Disease, Clinical Biomarkers, & Ins./Employment Risks 
Return of Research Results and the Loss of a Chance Doctrine 
Genetic Data and Adaptive Immunoreceptor Repertoire Projects 
Fair Data Sharing and Data Caring in the Digitized Era 
Data Hoarding in Genomics Can Kill:  What Can We Do About It? 
5:00 [open slot somewhere on this panel] 
5:15 Concluding Remarks 
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THE NEXT STAGE OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE AND PRECLINICAL BIOMARKERS: 
AN EVALUATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION RISKS 
BASED ON BIOMARKER STATUS  
Jalayne Arias* 
*UCSF School of Medicine 
This presentation will report data from a study that examines the legal, ethical and social consequences of 
preclinical biomarkers in Alzheimer’s disease. Preclinical Alzheimer’s disease biomarkers are measures of 
amyloid or tau that correlate with the “hallmark” plaques and tangles of the disease. These biomarkers 
indicate the presence of disease pathology and are detectible up to 20 years before symptoms present. 
While the preclinical use of biomarkers has been restricted to research purposes, leading clinical trials rely 
on the hypothesis that the best hope for disease modifying therapy relies on treatment before symptoms 
emerge. Therefore, biomarkers will be critical to identifying individuals who are most likely to benefit from 
preclinical treatment. Conversely, biomarkers may raise novel legal and ethical issues  
This study uses empirical legal research methods and semi-structured interviews with physicians (n=17) 
and human resource managers (n=9). Here we will report on data showing gaps in employment and 
insurance anti-discrimination legal protections. We compare these results with physician and human 
resource manager perspectives on the potential consequences of biomarker status in the context of 
employment and insurance. The presentation will describe likely outcomes of future patients who receive 
their biomarker status in the context of employment and insurance. This descriptive data will highlight the 
need for a re-evaluation of current legal standards. The presentation will close by identifying research and 
policy goals for developing anti-discrimination protections tailored to Alzheimer’s disease biomarker status.  
 
 
IP’S LOST EINSTEINS 
Stephanie Plamondon Bair* 
*BYU Law School 
Intellectual property offers private incentives to artists and inventors. Its goal is to spur advances in the arts 
and sciences that wouldn’t otherwise happen.  But though intellectual property is concerned with how much 
innovation society produces, in its current form it has little to say about who is doing the innovative work—
and reaping the attendant rewards. 
This is a problem. Accumulating evidence shows that the benefits of owning intellectual property accrue 
disproportionately to advantaged groups. One recent study, for instance, finds that a poor child with 
outstanding math skills has less of a chance of ever holding a patent than a rich child, even when the rich 
child is much worse at math.  A review of copyright registrations by Robert Brauneis and Dotan Oliar reveals 
that white authors are overrepresented in the copyright system, while Hispanic authors in particular suffer 
extreme underrepresentation.  And Dan Burk has drawn attention to the “gender gap” in patent law, pointing 
out that women engineers and scientists hold a disproportionately small number of patents relative to the 
men they work with. These imbalances don’t just hurt those denied opportunities to participate in the IP 
system –society’s “lost Einsteins” as they have been called. The general public also suffers as we miss out 
on the collective benefit of all the innovations and artistic advances that might have been.    
What causes these disparities, and what should we do about it? Those who have explored the topic have 
implicated unequal opportunity, bias, IP doctrines that reward typically male risk-taking behaviors—the 
usual cultural suspects. But here, I’d like to propose that something beyond culture and socialization might 
also be responsible for many of our lost Einsteins. Recent work in the neurosciences suggests that the 
realities disadvantaged groups often contend with may affect their decision-making processes in ways that 
impact their ability to innovate. Specifically, when people are chronically stressed, when people are 
chronically sleep-deprived, they are less likely to think and act in ways that lead to creative breakthroughs.  
These findings are troubling for two reasons. First, because the psychological and neural aspects of 
innovation are less easily observed than some of the previously-identified cultural factors (like bias in the 
workplace), they run the risk of being overlooked.  Second, because external factors like stress and sleep 
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deprivation operate on the individual in ways that change decision-making, there is a danger that outside 
observers will wrongly chalk up resulting behaviors to an inherent failing or lack of talent. This, in turn, feeds 
the cultural fire of stereotype and bias. 
The neural aspect of the lost Einstein phenomenon also suggests that we need to think much more broadly 
and aggressively about how to solve innovative disparities. Though we should continue to tackle cultural 
issues like bias and IP doctrines that disadvantage certain groups, we should also consider a more holistic 
approach that addresses the lives and needs of individual inventors.   
 
 
HARNESSING VIRTUAL REALITY TO PREVENT PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Kate E. Bloch* 
*UC Hastings College of Law 
It was the confession of a man facing death, but not the man convicted of the capital crime.1 This confession 
came from the terminally ill prosecutor, whose suppression of evidence many years earlier had helped put 
the accused on death row.2 In Connick v. Thompson, the prosecutor admitted deliberately withholding 
evidence, evidence that would subsequently lead to the exoneration of the accused.3 
Prosecutorial failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence can violate the U.S. Constitution and 
undermine justice. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland, which gave voice to this 
constitutional requirement, dates to 1963, more than half a century ago.4 Yet, court cases, like Connick, 
and related investigations bear witness to the continuing practice and detrimental consequences of such 
prosecutorial failure to disclose.5 As Brady focuses on the consequence to the accused, rather than on the 
mental state of the prosecutor, Brady condemns the failure to disclose whether it is in good or bad faith.6 
Recent scholarship on Brady error suggests that prosecutorial failure to disclose may often stem from 
circumstances or cognitive processes that undermine the prosecutor’s awareness of the exculpatory nature 
of the evidence at issue or the importance of disclosing it.7 Confirmation bias is an example of this type of 
process.8 Under the influence of confirmation bias, an individual, generally without conscious awareness, 
selects and adopts evidence that supports the individual’s pre-existing viewpoint and underweights or 
rejects evidence contrary to this pre-existing perspective.9 Such bias can cause prosecutors to miss the 
exculpatory quality of evidence or to discount its value, which can lead to failure to disclose.10 
Finding effective approaches for disrupting such cognitive bias may be key to truncating the long trajectory 
of Brady constitutional violations. Advances in cognitive science research suggest that perspective-taking 
                                                     
 
1 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 61, 83-90 (2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
5 See e.g., Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley, The verdict: Dishonor, Chicago Tribune (Jan. 11, 1999) (last accessed Jan. 15, 2018) 
available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial1-story.html. 
6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
7 For discussions of cognitive bias research applied to prosecutorial Brady decision making, see e.g., Hadar Aviram, Legally Blind: 
Hyperadversarialism, Brady Violations and the Prosecutorial Organizational Culture, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (2013); Alafair S. 
Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decisionmaking: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593 (2006) 
(“This Article explores four related but separate aspects of cognitive bias that can contribute to imperfect theory formation and 
maintenance: confirmation bias, selective information processing, belief perseverance, and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance.”); 
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Why Do Brady Violations Happen: Cognitive Bias and Beyond, 37-MAY Champion 12 (2013). Cognitive bias is, of 
course, not the sole explanation available or offered by scholars to explain Brady error. See e.g., Yaroshefsky, supra. 
8 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REVIEW OF GEN. PSYCH. 175, 175 
(1998). 
9 Id. at 175 (“It refers usually to unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence. The line between deliberate selectivity in 
the use of evidence and unwitting molding of facts to fit hypotheses or beliefs is a difficult one to draw in practice, but the distinction 
is meaningful conceptually, and confirmation bias has more to do with the latter than with the former.”). 
10 See e.g., Burke, supra note 7, at 1603-1613. 
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through virtual reality (immersive virtual environments), if properly designed and engaged, can effectively 
modify an individual’s explicit and implicit cognitive bias and resulting behavior.11 This article explores 
whether the innovative power of digital avatars might be harnessed to enable prosecutors to more 
effectively see the exculpatory nature of evidence and to be more inclined to disclose it. If the power can 
be harnessed for that purpose, avatars may reinforce or re-introduce prosecutorial self-regulation as a first 
line of defense against Brady violations. 
 
 
HEALTHCARE’S GORDIAN KNOT: TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND CLINICAL 
COSTS 
M. Gregg Bloche* 
*Georgetown Law 
After several years of deceptive stability in the last, deep recession’s wake, medical spending has resumed 
its long-term rise.  The central, intractable obstacle to long-term cost containment remains the near-
impossibility of saying “no” to ever-more-expensive care that yields small marginal benefits.  Psychology, 
culture, clinical ethics, law, and stakeholders’ settled expectations lock in this impossibility.  Not surprisingly, 
regulatory and market-driven strategies urged by both the left and right have failed for decades to surmount 
it.  We propose, instead, to circumvent it, by redirecting cost-control policy away from efforts to limit use of 
existing, low-benefit technologies and toward strategies for influencing the emergence of new 
technology.  To this end, we urge: (1) redesign of value-based payment to emphasize variable future 
rewards for tests and treatments that haven’t yet emerged, and (2) varying the duration of intellectual-
property protection and other market exclusivities so as to tie their rewards to therapeutic 
effectiveness.  Our aim is to transform research and development incentives by more generously rewarding 
therapeutic breakthroughs while shrinking payoffs for me-too and marginal advances.  By reshaping 
incentives  at the R & D stage, before stakeholders make large financial commitments and stoke public 
expectations, health policy can promote high-value advances while discouraging the marginal innovations 
that are the main drivers of rising costs. 
The strategy we urge was, until recently, impractical.  Long lag times between initiation of prospective 
clinical trials and publication of results, plus narrow patient inclusion criteria, made their “gold-standard” 
evidence mostly unavailable in “real time,” for the purpose of setting payment rates or periods of market 
exclusivity.  But medicine’s ongoing big-data revolution, made possible by electronic records and 
interoperability, is transforming this picture.  Comparative efficacy can be tracked in near-real time for large 
numbers of patients, and suspected confounders can be factored out.  Working with an aggregator of such 
data, from multiple mid-Atlantic health care systems, we are attempting a proof-of-concept for several high-
cost cancer therapies. 
 
 
                                                     
 
11 11 On the use of avatars to reduce cognitive bias generally and with respect to explicit bias toward elderly persons, see e.g., Nick 
Yee and Jeremy Bailenson, Walk a Mile in Digital Shoes: The Impact of Embodied Perspective- Taking on Reduction of Negative 
Stereotyping in Immersive Virtual Environments (Jan. 2006) (last accessed Jan. 5, 2018) available at 
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Walk-A-Mile-in-Digital-Shoes-The-Impact-of-Embodie-Yee- 
Bailenson/ec4dcaa6cd9841bcc0993cdd365f720ebf9b6f3e . On the use of avatars to reduce implicit cognitive bias based on race, see 
e.g., Domna Banakou, Parasuram D.Hanumanth, and Mel Slater, Virtual Embodiment of White People in a Black Virtual Body Leads 
to a Sustained Reduction in their Implicit Racial Bias, 10 FRONTIERS IN HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2016) (last accessed Jan. 16, 
2018), available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5126081/pdf/fnhum-10-00601.pdf. But see Victoria Groom, 
Jeremy N. Bailenson, and Clifford Nass, The influence of racial embodiment on racial bias in immersive virtual environments, 1 (Psych. 
Press, 2009), (last accessed Jan. 16, 2018), available at: https://vhil.stanford.edu/mm/2009/groom-racial-embodiment.pdf. For a 
discussion of the potential of virtual reality for social neuroscience research, see Thomas D. Parsons, Andrea Gaggioli, and Giuseppe 
Riva, Virtual Reality for Research in Social Neuroscience, 7 BRAIN SCIENCES 42 (2017), (last accessed Jan. 16, 2017), available 
at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5406699/. 
 10 
 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSCIENCE RIGHTS IN HEALTH CARE  
Mary Anne Bobinski* 
*Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia 
Health care professionals have asserted conscience rights in refusing to provide a wide range of health 
services, information or referrals. These objections may apply to all patients or to the provision of care to 
specific types of patients, such the use of reproductive technology by members of the LGBTQ community. 
The Trump Administration recently created the Conscience and Religious Freedom division in DHHS to 
highlight protection for these concerns. This talk will explore the issue of conscience rights from a global 
perspective, focusing on recent developments in conscience rights in Canada, Australia and the U.K. The 
talk will also consider the influence of the U.S. debate internationally and the relevance of comparative 
approaches. 
 
 
ARE UNIVERSITIES PATENT TROLLS OR TARGETS? ANALYZING A DECADE OF 
UNIVERSITY PATENT LITIGATION 
Tania Bubela*, Yael Mansour, Mark Bieber, and Brian Howard 
*Simon Fraser University 
In 2007, Mark Lemley posed the provocative question – are universities patent trolls? Patent trolls, 
otherwise known as patent assertion or non-practicing entities (NPEs), which aggressively assert 
aggregated patent rights. NPEs operate from a position of strength in that they cannot be countersued for 
infringement because they have no products in a market to threaten and they have no repeat-player 
constraints. There is speculation that NPEs may have a hold-up impact on innovative sectors, especially 
information and bio- technology. It is unclear, however, whether universities, as holders of substantial patent 
portfolios mediated by their technology transfer offices, act as NPEs or may be the target of aggressive 
litigation. To shed light on this issue, we analysed US patent litigation filings in which a university, research 
institute or affiliated hospital (collectively university) was a party from 2006-2017, identified in the 
LexMachina legal analytics database (lexmachina.com).  Collectively, universities were plaintiffs in 424 
cases and defendants in 84, over 648 patents. There was a spike (3X) in filings in 2013, despite 2011 rule 
changes under the America Invents Act designed to reduce patent litigation. The majority of cases settled. 
The most common fields were human therapeutics, molecular diagnostics and devices, followed by 
semiconductors and related devices. In the majority of cases the university was a co-plaintiff/defendant 
alongside an exclusive licensee, including university spin-off companies, but we provide a summary of 
litigation between universities (e.g., Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania v. St. Jude Children’s 
Research Hospital over cancer immunotherapy CAR-T constructs). Nevertheless, the volume of litigation 
imposes substantial costs on universities. Universities involved in the most litigation were Boston University 
(n=43), Stanford University (n=33), and Duke University (n=24). Our results conform with Mark Lemley’s 
conclusion that universities are not acting as patent trolls, however, we are in the process of analyzing 
whether universities are licensing to NPEs. The volume of litigation may best be addressed through careful 
consideration of exclusive licensing practices and terms. 
 
 
LAWYERS’ ROLE IN ART CONTRACTS OF UNCERTAIN ENFORCEABILITY 
June Carbone* 
*University of Minnesota Law School 
The talk will address the obligations of lawyers in the context of unregulated surrogacy and other ART 
transactions.  In particular, the talk will consider what obligations lawyers have to clients to inform them of 
the questionable enforceability of clauses related to abortion, selective reduction and other matters.  The 
talk will address the purpose such clauses serve in establishing parties' expectations and the duty of 
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lawyers in calling attention to such clauses, especially where clients may be relying on the other party's 
agreement to clauses that may be unenforceable as a matter of law.   
 
 
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT “IDENTITY” IN NEUROTECHNOLOGY: I ,  
ROBOT? 
Bill Casebeer* 
*Lockheed Martin 
A review of the literature in theories of personal identity to discuss what impact neurotechnology for memory 
sharing (such as that being developed by Google's Division Eight) might have on notions of the extended 
self--I will sketch out tensions between libertarian and communitarian notions of the self that this technology 
highlights and what upshot this has for our self-conception. 
 
 
DATA-HOARDING IN GENOMICS CAN KILL. WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT? 
Robert Cook-Deegan* 
*Arizona State University 
Interpreting the clinical significance of genomic variants that confer risk of disease among the more than 
20,000 human genes is a task well beyond the capacity of even the largest labs, medical centers, and even 
national health systems (where they exist; clearly not in the USA).  Making clinical use of genomic data will 
necessarily entail collecting such data and linking them to clinical, environmental and personal/social data, 
while following outcomes over time.  Sources of genomic data have already shifted from primarily research 
studies to clinical, ancestry, and other genomic testing in commercial laboratories.  The databases, expert 
curation, and pooling of data are essential, but diaphanous and only somewhat organized.  Business 
incentives are disparate, and some proprietary strategies actively undermine data-pooling.  The 
"community" needed to establish a commons is only beginning to realize the extent of the problems and 
the need to build infrastructure and develop rules.  The talk will progress from some examples of how 
people are harmed by deficiencies in the current system, point to some possible solutions, and end with 
suggestions for legal and social science research to address the problems. 
 
 
EMBRYO MOSAICISM AND IMPACTS ON CLINICAL PRACTICE IN 
REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 
Judith Daar* 
*UCLA School of Law (visiting); University of California Irvine, School of Medicine 
Advances in preimplantation genetic testing (PGT) of embryos permit prospective parents to learn a great 
deal about their potential future child’s health, including whether the child will experience health impacts 
caused by aneuploidy -  the presence of too many or too few chromosomes in each cell. Now nearing the 
end of its third decade in use, PGT has grown in sophistication and accuracy which in turn poses challenges 
in the informed consent arena precisely because of the highly technical data genetic testing reveals. 
Provider disclosure challenges have intensified over the past several years as PGT laboratories began to 
report on the phenomenon of embryo mosaicism – a condition in which testing detects more than one cell 
line in the blastocyst. Typically, a mosaic embryo contains one normal (euploid) cell line and one abnormal 
(aneuploidy) cell line, making it possible that the resulting child could be born with a health-affecting genetic 
anomaly. Some estimates place the number of embryos detected as mosaic through PGT as high as 30 
percent of all embryos screened.  
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The main challenge mosaic embryos currently present is that physicians simply do not know if the resulting 
child will express the normal cell line (healthy) or the abnormal cell line (unhealthy). A handful of studies 
found that when certain mosaic embryos were transferred into the patient’s uterus after full disclosure of 
the potential outcomes, the resulting babies were born with a normal genome. Researchers speculate that 
the abnormal cell line migrated to the trophectoderm (the part of the early embryo that becomes the 
placenta, not the child), or self-corrected at some point in early embryonic development.  While advancing 
technologies - including high-resolution next- generation sequencing - allow mosaicism to be detected with 
greater sensitivity than earlier methods, researchers and clinicians remain uncertain about whether any 
resulting child will be born with a normal genome. Given this uncertainty, the health care team must wrestle 
with decisions regarding transfer of such embryos as well as the nature and extent of information to be 
shared with the patient as part of the informed consent process. 
This presentation will review the current state-of-the-art in PGT as it relates to embryo mosaicism. Based 
on recent interviews, the presentation will discuss select clinic practices regarding transfer of embryos 
deemed mosaic. To aid in further development of best practices under these clinical circumstances, the 
presentation will suggest the rights and interests a clinic could consider in developing a policy that meets 
the requirements of informed consent. Whether insisting that no mosaic embryo should be transferred 
because of its potential to yield an unhealthy child, or agreeing to transfer based on the reproductive 
autonomy of the patient, fertility clinics are encouraged to act in a consistent manner with constant vigilance 
to emerging data in the field.        
 
 
BIOETHICS V BIOPOLITICS 
Osagie K. Obasogie* and Marcy Darnovsky+ 
*University of California, Berkeley, Joint Medical Program and School of Public Health; +Center for 
Genetics and Society. 
For decades, the field of bioethics has shaped the way we think about ethical problems in science, 
technology, and medicine. But its traditional emphasis on individual dynamics such as doctor-patient 
relationships, informed consent, and personal autonomy is minimally helpful in confronting many of the 
social and political challenges posed by new human biotechnologies such as assisted reproduction, human 
genetic modification, and DNA forensics.  
We argue that these issues, and the legal and policy challenges related to them, can best be understood 
and addressed from an emerging standpoint that is attentive to race, gender, class, disability, privacy, and 
notions of democracy—a “new biopolitics.” An anthology that we have edited, which will be released this 
March (Beyond Bioethics: Toward a New Biopolitics, University of California Press), brings together the 
work of several dozen cutting-edge thinkers from diverse fields of study and public engagement, all of them 
committed to this new perspective grounded in social justice and public interest values. 
At BioLaw LaPalooza we propose to provide a brief but provocative overview of the concerns that motivated 
the compilation of this volume and that underlie the work of its contributors. We anticipate a lively exchange. 
 
 
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE PERSONALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Deborah W. Denno* 
*Fordham University School of Law 
How can advances in neuroscience help make the criminal justice system more personalized, effective, 
and fair? I have gathered an original database of every criminal case that has addressed neuroscience 
evidence in any capacity over the course of two decades (totaling 800 cases), thus providing a nuanced 
and multifaceted assessment of how and why neuroscience evidence is actually used in criminal courts 
and the implications it can have for criminal justice reform. 
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This proposed talk will focus on how defendants construct personalized defenses in the criminal law, 
especially those that most readily comport with neuroscience evidence: diminished capacity, insanity, 
competency, lowered mens rea, or involuntariness. The talk will analyze the nature and extent to which 
attorneys attempt to personalize their clients by relying on neuroscience and what appear to be the most 
successful strategies. The talk will also assess how funding impacts on how well attorneys can defend their 
clients by using neuroscience evidence. If in fact the level of personalization that neuroscience affords can 
be effective for mitigating sentences—and initial results show it can be—then it is important for the criminal 
justice system to provide appropriate financial support for defense attorneys to acquire testing for their 
clients, within reason of course. My (as yet unpublished) research demonstrates that some state systems 
are more efficient and successful than others by way of ensuring the availability of resources, especially 
sophisticated tests and testifying experts. 
Yet the process of investigating, introducing, and challenging neuroscience evidence within the parameters 
of a criminal courtroom is costly. Many of the criminal cases in my extensive database include a host of 
experts for both the prosecution and the defense. Further analysis of my data will enable an evidence-
based assessment of the involvement of such experts, with the goal of developing a more fair and cost-
efficient system to address the needs of defendants for whom neuroscience evidence is most relevant and 
incarceration least effective. If, in their earliest interactions, police officers are trained to recognize would-
be defendants with potential mental disabilities (and there are now such programs in place), it may be 
possible to embark upon a path that avoids courtrooms altogether for these individuals. 
Neuroscience research will continue to impact how law and society view human nature and human actions. 
The key question becomes whether the criminal justice system will adapt to the explosion of neuroscientific 
information through conscious deliberation, what this proposed talk recommends, or through haphazard 
implementation of discrete decisions—the direction is which our criminal justice system seems to be 
headed. The answer will determine how fair and effective we want our justice system to be. 
 
 
MYRIAD IN THE US AND AUSTRALIA 
Rochelle Dreyfuss* & Dianne Nicol+ 
*NYU School of Law; +University of Tasmania 
This paper examines the Myriad decisions in the United States and Australia, which bar patents on naturally 
occurring products—specifically, on isolated genes.  These decisions leave many open questions on the 
patentability of products and processes that duplicate (or come close to duplicating) material found in 
nature.   They release material for free use by researchers and for patient care. However, they also 
endanger the future of privately-supported research in the life sciences.  The two decisions are, however, 
not identical and their local impact also appears to be considerably different.   The paper will explore these 
differences. First, we will ask whether the Australian decision suggests limiting principles: a path to a patent 
law that deals more successfully with dual-use technologies (inventions that are simultaneously research 
inputs and commercial outputs).   We are, however, skeptical about that possibility.  Second, we look at the 
factors in Australian practice that ameliorated the effects of gene patenting prior to the decision in Myriad 
and suggest ways in which US law could better reflect those factors to create greater certainty for all 
stakeholders. 
 
 
BRAIN SCIENCE AND THE LAW OF CONSENT: COGNITIVE AND VOLITIONAL 
CAPACITY 
Jennifer A. Drobac* 
*Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law 
Based upon Jennifer A. Drobac and Oliver R. Goodenough, The Myth of Consent (contract for publication 
with Cambridge University Press, anticipated 2019) 
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This talk will explore why the scientific facts concerning particular adult neurological and psychosocial 
conditions are incongruent with the civil law of consent. Specifically, it will focus on not only cognitive 
capacity, but also volitional capacity. It challenges the Milton Friedman notion of the “rational actor” and 
concepts of “radical consent.” It examines how brain sciences suggest a different approach to an evaluation 
of adult consent. The book, upon which the talk will be based, is the second monograph of a continuing 
academic inquiry concerning brain sciences and the civil laws regarding consent, pertinent to a number of 
adult, as well as juvenile, populations. 
The talk will present specific brain science and explore how it demonstrates inconsistencies between 
human functioning and current civil law regarding consent and capacity. 
 
 
EVERGREENING IN THE HIGHEST GROSSING DRUG COMPANIES 
Robin Feldman* 
*UC Hastings College of Law 
Even in sub-optimally competitive markets such as health care, one might expect to see some measure of 
competition, at least in certain circumstances. Although anecdotal evidence has identified instances of 
evergreening, which can be defined as artificially extending the protection cliff, we wanted to examine the 
extent to which the behavior is pervasive. Is it simply a matter of certain bad actors, to whom everyone 
points repeatedly, or is the problem endemic to the industry? 
This study examines the products of the top 15 highest grossing drug companies between 2005 and 2015, 
identifying and analyzing every instance in which the companies added new patents or exclusivities. The 
study draws from a data set we developed encompassing all non-biologic drugs on the market between 
2005 and 2015. Assembling the data set involved extracting and interpreting 160,000 individual data points 
from archival FDA data, much of which is no longer available from the FDA itself. We intend to make the 
data set public upon publication of our work. 
 
 
SPERM DONATION ERRORS AND RACE 
Dov Fox* 
*University of San Diego School of Law 
As a lesbian growing up in a small farm town, Jennifer Cramblett knew the sting of not fitting in. When she 
and her partner decided to start a family, they looked for a donor who’d resemble them. But the sperm bank 
switched the white donor she’d requested with a black one. Their “obviously mixed race[] baby girl” marked 
them as racially different in their 98%-white suburb. Their daughter’s “irrepressibl[y]” African-American 
heritage disrupted the couple’s vision of the normalizing family life they’d hoped for. The mix-up forced them 
to face her community’s indifference to racial exclusion and the stinging insults of an uncle who “speaks 
openly and derisively about persons of color.” Cramblett’s pending federal diversity suit complains that she 
lacks the “cultural competency” required to navigate the unplanned “challenges [of] transracial parenting.”  
My project argues that the harms Cramblett suffered, real though they are, should find no recourse under 
the law. Judicial recognition of those injuries, framed as a response to racial prejudice and disadvantage, 
would dignify the very biases to which the Supreme Court has in the child-custody context declared “the 
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give [] effect.” Reproductive autonomy and wellbeing warrant robust legal 
protection. And race sorting in family formation remains a source of evolving conflict more than anything 
approach consensus. But courts would err to wield the power of the torts system to breath life into the 
divisive message that it is worse for prospective parents to have children with darker skin or mixed ancestry.  
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EXPLORING SOME LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE RESEARCH 
FINDING SEX DIFFERENCES IN THE BRAIN 
Betsy Grey* 
*Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University 
Research in neuroscience increasingly is documenting real (if not earth-shattering) differences between 
male and female brains, including structural, maturation and hormonal differences.    Research also 
observes sex-associated differences in cognition and behavior, including sex-biased conditions of mental 
disorders.  For a long time, the neuroscience community mostly considered any observed sex- associated 
differences in cognition and behavior in humans to be due to the effects of cultural differences.  But now 
scientists are beginning to ask whether brain differences may contribute to those differences. 
Given this research, will law need to take into account sex-biased differences in cognition and behavior?  
Should it ignore those differences or accommodate them?  Discrimination law, for example, has 
(appropriately) been hostile to differential treatment based on sex.  Should advances in neuroscience create 
room for any exceptions to the societal values of equal treatment?  
This project is at its earliest stages.  In the talk, I will give some examples of legal doctrine and theory that 
may be challenged by these neuroscience advances and invite feedback in ways to approach them.    
 
 
TECHNOLOGY, PATIENTS, AND THE LAW 
Leslie C. Griffin* & Paul Harlan Janda 
*University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law 
Dr. Paul Janda is a neurologist at the Las Vegas Neurology Center. He is also Program Director of the 
Neurology Residency Program at Valley Hospital Medical Center. And a Californian by birth from two 
California doctors! He attended both Stanford and Berkeley undergrad, and has an impressive list of 
medical credentials, including time at Touro, UCLA, and Wake Forest. He is also a 2016 graduate of the 
law school where I teach, UNLV. He is now the first and only board certified neurologist-lawyer in Nevada. 
Janda helped to write and pass a recent Nevada brain death statute that uses the American Academy of 
Neurology’s evidence-based standards to set uniform legal guidelines for the determination of brain death.  
Janda was never my doctor or my student. But he spent time in the hospital where I was recovering from a 
brain injury. He gave encouragement and advice to my family, friends, and colleagues, who were all there 
simply waiting for me to wake up.  
Unfortunately, Dr. Janda’s work schedule makes him unable to attend this conference. He has agreed to 
write, with me, an article about brain injury and technology. I will present the talk and we will write it. 
I have two slides to show you. The first is an MRI of my brain in April 1993. I had just graduated from law 
school in 1992 and was clerking for Ninth Circuit Judge Mary Schroeder in Phoenix. Several weeks earlier 
I had won a prestigious research fellowship to Harvard. Then a car hit me as I was crossing the street. 
Janda says this was a serious injury but it looked like I received good surgical care.  
The second picture is more recent. On October 7, 2016, a stranger attacked me, picking me up, throwing 
me on my head, and then kicking me. He was imprisoned to 6-15 years for attempted murder.  
In my experience, the first injury was much worse than the second. However, according to Dr. Janda, this 
second slide, with its blood within the brain, was “more threatening” than the first.  
Both times some of my doctors predicted either my death or my permanent confinement with serious brain 
damage. Dr. Janda admits he has never seen anyone recover as I did from such a serious injury. 
After such an experience, there are lessons to be learned and work to be done. This paper will focus on 
the relationship among technology, patients, and the law.  
Technological improvements were part of Dr. Janda’s work in the brain death area, for example, when he 
helped to change the law to set uniform medical guidelines for death. His work for this paper will explain 
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the technological details of recognizing brain injuries in general and my two injuries in particular. He will 
focus on the best ways doctors can use technology to serve health.  
I will tell my patient’s story. I can identify ways that patients are harmed by the type of treatment we currently 
receive. The patient’s road is much more difficult than it appears to outsiders, and needs much 
improvement. I then recommend methods that should be devoted to our care.  
We then identify how the law can improve the use of technology and increase patient care in the brain injury 
area.  
 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCESS TO MEDICAL MARIJUANA IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Lewis A. Grossman* 
*American University Washington College of Law 
I would like to discuss following chapter from my book-in-progress titled Choose Your Medicine: Freedom 
of Therapeutic Choice in American History and Law. 
Chapter Eight—Life, Liberty, [and the Pursuit of Happiness]: The Struggle for Access to Medical 
Marijuana in Historical Perspective 
The struggle for access to medical marijuana differs from other battles for therapeutic freedom described 
in this book because marijuana also has a popular, though controversial, nontherapeutic use—delivery of 
a recreational high. This distinctive characteristic of cannabis has posed special legal, political, and 
rhetorical challenges for medical marijuana advocates. 
First, many citizens, judges, and government officials oppose the legalization of marijuana for medical uses, 
regardless of whether it offers actual therapeutic benefits. They do so because of the public health harms 
and moral degradation they associate with drug abuse. These opponents suspect (with good reason) that 
many “medical marijuana” purchasers are actually recreational users. Moreover, they fear (again with good 
reason) that many pot activists consider medical cannabis legalization to be simply the first step on the path 
to full legalization.    
A second unique problem for medical marijuana advocates is that the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
likely for political reasons, continues to categorize marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance—that is, 
one with “no currently accepted medical use” and a “high potential for abuse.” Consequently, researchers 
interested in assessing marijuana’s therapeutic efficacy confront high, and often insurmountable, regulatory 
obstacles.  
A third, less obvious problem for medical marijuana supporters—reflected in the slogan “Health before 
Happy Hour”—has been negotiating their strained affiliation with advocates for comprehensive marijuana 
legalization. Medical marijuana proponents have long contended that the broader legalization drive neglects 
the critical needs of patients by accepting regulatory conditions unacceptable to medical users. These 
conditions include, for example, limits on product strength and amount and the imposition of sales or sin 
taxes. Conversely, supporters of recreational use believe, accurately, that medical marijuana proponents 
are often ambivalent about comprehensive legalization and sometimes work to obstruct it.      
Following an introduction, this chapter considers regulation of the medical use of alcohol during prohibition 
as a historical and legal precedent. It then highlights the issues mentioned above while relating the story of 
the medical marijuana movement from the 1970s to present. This campaign is one of the prime examples 
of a successful extrajudicial social movement for liberty of therapeutic choice. As late as the 1990s, less 
than 30 percent of Americas supported the legalization of medical cannabis; today nearly 90 percent do. 
Although courts have uniformly rejected arguments for medical marijuana access, therapeutic use of the 
drug is now legal in the majority of states.  
Nevertheless, medical marijuana advocates face new challenges. Unless Congress extends a law 
preventing federal interference with state medical marijuana programs, Attorney General Jeff Sessions—
who has officially rescinded the hands-off enforcement approach set forth in the Obama-era “Cole 
Memorandum”—seems prepared to resume prosecutions. Conversely, if this or a subsequent 
administration permits the small but growing number of states that have legalized recreational use as well 
 17 
 
as medical use to implement these policies, medical cannabis risks losing its distinctiveness, both as a 
commercial market and as a focus of activism.    
 
 
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS ARE SET UP TO FAIL 
Yaniv Heled* 
* Georgia State University College of Law 
In their article, “Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier,” 1  Michael Carrier and Carl Minniti provide a 
comprehensive review of the various kinds of antitrust violations that beleaguer pharmaceutical markets in 
the United States. Carrier & Minniti examine the applicability of these anticompetitive behaviors to 
biopharmaceutical (a.k.a. biologics) markets, and in doing so alert regulators and courts to such potential 
antitrust violations in the emerging area of follow-on biologics. Carrier & Minniti’s article also provides 
recommendations for limiting anticompetitive behavior in biologics markets that will, no doubt, serve as a 
valuable guide for regulators, judges, and practitioners. Yet, Carrier & Minniti’s article appears to share in 
an optimism about the prospects of such markets: that if we just policed them properly, competition could 
be guaranteed and, with it, prices would drop significantly. Such optimism is unwarranted.  
The legislative and regulatory efforts to instill competition into biologics markets have been fraught, from 
their outset, with persistent and mostly successful counter-efforts by the brand-name pharmaceutical 
industry (“Industry”) to make follow-on biologics a limited and contained regulatory and commercial 
phenomenon. To that end, the Industry—with its lobbying spearheads, BIO and PhRMA—and its many 
allies in Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal administrations, have been waging war to 
maintain existing and erect new regulatory obstacles to the development, approval, and marketing of follow-
on biologics. The Industry’s success in undercutting the emergence of truly competitive follow-on biologics 
markets thus far rests on four pillars: (1) an Industry-favorable, obstructed pathway for the approval of 
follow-on biologics; (2) acceptance and upholding of the view that regulatory filings submitted to the FDA 
are proprietary and confidential; (3) state laws making onerous the substitution of biologics with follow-on 
versions thereof; and (4) efforts to block any and all specific attempts to make, gain approval for, and sell 
follow-on biologics. Of these four pillars, the area of antitrust law (and, thus, Carrier & Minniti’s article) 
addresses mostly the fourth. Yet, the emergence of competitively robust follow-on biologics markets 
requires dismantling more than one pillar. Until then, efforts to open biologics markets to competition will 
continue to be no more than a rearguard battle over the approval and marketing of a small number of follow-
on versions of a mere handful of original products with limited substitutability. The price, as always, will be 
borne by payors, patients, and ultimately, the public.  
In this comment, I discuss each of the four pillars supporting the Industry’s success in inhibiting the 
development, approval, and marketing of follow-on biologics. I show that unlike the story of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, that of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) does not and probably 
will not have a happy ending; that if the goal is to significantly lower biologics’ prices, then the paradigm of 
approval of follow-on biologics in the United States would need to change.    
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF AGE AND GENDER ON THIRD-PARTY PUNISHMENT 
Morris Hoffman*, Francis Shen, Vijeth Iyengar, Nina Motazedi, & Frank Krueger 
*Second Judicial District, State of Colorado 
Do humans punish norm violators more harshly or less harshly as we age?  This question is not only 
important in its own right, as researchers begin to study third-party punishment in a systematic and 
interdisciplinary fashion, but it also bears on vital public policy issues, including what sorts of individuals we 
                                                     
 
1 Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 Il. L. Rev. 1 (2018). 
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should be selecting as our judges and jurors.  Using well-studied criminal hypotheticals, which varied both 
the level of harm and the wrongdoer’s mental state (whether he was acting intentionally or just recklessly), 
our experiment showed there are significant interaction effects between the punisher’s age and gender, 
and the level of harm caused by the norm violation, in both the intentional and reckless conditions.  Older 
men punish low-harm violations much less harshly than younger men, but this difference reverses when 
the harms become high—older men punish high harms more harshly than younger men.  Women punishers 
did not exhibit this age-inversion phenomenon, but did punish more harshly than their same-age male 
counterparts across all harms.  These patterns persisted when we analyzed data from the World Values 
Survey.  To confirm their ecological validity, we are also surveying several hundred actual criminal cases 
from the state of Colorado decided between 2001 and 2016. 
 
 
FOR MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES, COMPLIANCE WITH THE WRITTEN 
DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT HAS BECOME A MOVING TARGET 
Christopher M. Holman* 
*University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School 
Monoclonal antibodies (Mabs) form the basis for some of the most important products of biotechnology.  In 
2016, for example, six of the top eight blockbuster drugs were based on monoclonal antibodies, with 
AbbVie’s Humira (adalimumab) leading the pack with reported revenues exceeding $16 billion.  Given the 
increasingly high cost of bringing new drugs to the market, and the abbreviated approval processes 
available to competitors under the Biologics Price Competition & Innovation Act (BPCIA), effective patent 
protection for monoclonal antibodies will continue to be an important consideration in a company’s decision 
to develop new monoclonal antibody-based products.  Until fairly recently, U.S. patent law seemed to offer 
relatively robust protection for monoclonal antibodies.  In particular, rulings of the Court of Appeals of the 
Federal Circuit in 2002 and 2004 interpreted the patent law’s written description requirement in a manner 
that purported to sanction patent claims broadly reciting a genus of functionally defined antibodies.  
However, in 2011, 2014, and now again in October, 2017, the Federal Circuit has issued opinions that 
disavow and effectively overrule the court’s earlier, patentee-friendly decisions, and which appear, at least 
for the time being, to have established the written description requirement as a major limitation on the 
available scope of patent protection for monoclonal antibody-based technologies.  My paper will trace the 
history of the Lilly written description requirement (LWD) as applied to antibodies,  beginning with a series 
of PTO guidelines and training materials (the “Guidelines”) that were issued in the wake of the Federal 
Circuit’s landmark UC Regents v. Eli Lilly decision in 1997, and then turning to five Federal Circuit decisions 
that have interpreted antibody-specific provisions of the Guidelines and/or applied the LWD to monoclonal 
antibody claims, including the court’s most recent decision in this area, Amgen v. Sanofi (2017).  It will then 
provide analysis, commentary, and suggestions for moving forward. 
 
 
FOR BETTER OR WORSE: THE FDA’S ROLE IN REGULATING PHARMACEUTICAL 
IMPROVEMENTS 
Dmitry Karshtedt* 
*George Washington University Law School 
Pharmaceutical companies have recently faced antitrust liability for introducing into the stream of commerce 
modified versions of drugs that they currently market—an activity that, on the surface, appears at worst 
benign and perhaps even salutary. Nonetheless, litigation has revealed that these companies sometimes 
change compositions of their drug products not because new formulations would lead to improved health 
outcomes, but principally in order to execute a strategy for effectively extending exclusive rights to sell their 
drug products by substituting the patented drug modifications for pioneering versions that are going off-
patent. This strategy runs counter to the goal of the legislative framework regulating branded and generic 
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drug approvals, which was to provide incentives for discoveries that raise the quality of patient care and 
human health by means of appropriate periods of exclusivity for manufacturers of branded drugs.  
In this Article, I contend that the ways in which extant rules of patent law apply to drug inventions, certain 
features of the regulatory framework under the federal Food Drug, and Cosmetic Act and its interactions 
with so-called “generic substitution” under state laws, and unique market forces in the pharmaceutical 
sector may combine to subvert the goal of the brand-generic framework, and propose a regulatory 
correction. I explain that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is well-positioned to induce the generation 
of useful comparative data that would help increase transparency with respect to drug modifications and 
propose a novel legal framework for rewarding firms that generate such data. I argue that this framework 
would discourage pretextual drug changes by pharmaceutical manufactures and thereby limit attempts to 
achieve questionable exclusivity extensions, help market participants identify such approaches when they 
are undertaken, and improve patient care and promote downstream clinical research based on scientific 
evidence gathered under the directives of the proposed scheme. Indeed, the FDA-focused solution 
advanced in this Article would help ensure that firms that actually focus on improving their pioneering drugs 
would receive both regulatory and market rewards, while firms that do not would continue to be exposed to 
litigation and face unfavorable treatment of their products from payers and physicians. 
 
 
MEDICALIZATION AND THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS 
Craig Konnoth* 
*University of Colorado Law School 
For decades, minority groups such as African-Americans, women, gays, and people with disabilities, have 
long looked to the law for protection.  Their group identities would incorporate a narrative based on a quest 
for legal rights, of legitimacy, and of vulnerability.  Law helped raise consciousness and consolidate identity 
around a cause.  Judges would acquiesce in these discourses, rendering law into, what I term, a civil rights 
discourse.    
Even as the heyday of minority rights-seeking through judicial intervention retreats, many individuals and 
groups seek rights, not through legal, but rather, through medical frames.  Medicine, even today, is viewed 
suspiciously by the vast majority of progressive scholars and activists as a tool of surveillance and social 
categorization, control, intervention, and coercion.  This Article argues, however, that as in the case of the 
law, groups constitute their identities using medical categories.  These medical categories help them 
understand how their bodies function, and help situates them within certain spaces in medical and other 
institutions.  Through these spaces, they build consciousness that coalesces into rights seeking goals.  
Medical discourse is deployed to seek goals both for treatment and management of their condition, but also 
as part of a broader movement to change society’s attitudes and treatment of various groups.  
Medical discourse is buttressed by certain legitimacy claims that evolved over the last century.  From being 
considered the fault of the individual, who could seek charity, but nothing more, technological discoveries 
transformed the perception of medical conditions into no-fault occurrences.  Individuals had a valid claim 
on society to address those claims.  This rationale undergirded the period’s rehabilitation and social security 
enactments.  Later in the century, by comparing themselves to racial minorities, those invoking medical 
discourse adopted a social constructivist position.  The harms those with medical conditions faced arose 
from society’s attitudes and structures.  Legislation like the Americans with Disabilities Act reflects this 
position.   
From these legitimacy narratives spring gatekeeping approaches.  Disputes arose over which conditions 
were truly “medical” in nature.  And only those medical conditions which are seen as not the fault of the 
individual (usually immutable conditions), and which do not invite social maltreatment (visible conditions, 
and those that deny individual social interaction and access to jobs) obtain the most protection.   In so 
doing, law largely delegates the rights-producing function it once monopolized to medicine; medicine is 
infused with rights discourse, transforming in important ways the relationship between medicine and the 
law.  
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LEGITIMATE MEDICINE IN THE AGE OF CONSUMERISM 
Matt Lamkin* 
*The University of Tulsa College of Law 
What is a “legitimate medical purpose” for prescribing drugs?  Under federal law, prescribing medications 
without such a purpose renders a physician a “drug trafficker” subject to draconian penalties.  Yet the DEA 
and courts have steadfastly refused to specify which purposes qualify as legitimate, even as they condemn 
to prison physicians who run afoul of this requirement.  Instead, drug enforcement actors have alternated 
between insisting, on the one hand, that the phrase “legitimate medical purpose” is impossible to define 
with any particularity and, on the other, that its meaning is so obvious that no elaboration is necessary. 
Recent developments highlight the growing importance of clarifying the scope of legitimate medicine.  In 
the midst of the opioid epidemic, drug enforcement actors have failed to give physicians sufficient guidance 
regarding the conduct that runs afoul of the Controlled Substances Act.  Meanwhile the increasingly likely 
prospect of “recreational” drugs like cannabis and MDMA obtaining FDA approval to treat specific conditions 
raises questions about which off-label prescriptions of these drugs would be deemed to lack a legitimate 
purpose.  If, for example, it would not be legitimate to prescribe cannabis simply to help a stressed-out 
patient relax, how could this be distinguished from the commonplace prescribing of drugs like Xanax to help 
healthy patients cope with sub-diagnostic levels of anxiety?  If it would not be legitimate to prescribe 
cannabis to enhance a patient’s sexual desire, how could this prohibition be reconciled with the FDA’s 
recent approval of another drug for precisely this purpose? 
On the sole occasion when the federal government has been pressed to define the scope of legitimate 
medical practice with particularity (in Gonzales v. Oregon), the government argued that “legitimate” 
medicine encompasses only those interventions that “aim to preserve the patient’s health or to cure, 
alleviate, prevent, or ‘treat’ the disease or its symptoms in the patient.”  Yet merely a moment’s reflection 
shows medicine’s scope cannot be so narrowly defined.  Since the dawn of the Western tradition, medicine 
has always included practices that are not aimed at healing.  Hippocratic doctors prescribed remedies for 
the purpose of preventing or terminating undesired pregnancies, irrespective of whether women’s health 
was at risk.  Today, physicians routinely offer interventions without any pretense of promoting health – 
prescribing Botox to enhance physical appearance, benzodiazepines to cope with ordinary social stresses, 
or (in some states) lethal drug cocktails to hasten death in terminally ill patients. 
Medicine’s aims cannot be limited to a narrow set of purposes – at least not without radically redefining the 
scope of the enterprise.  Rather, what distinguishes “medical” practices from other kinds of interventions is 
not the ends being pursued, but the means being used to achieve them.  Medicine is better understood as 
the application of certain types of interventions – in particular, technologies rooted in biology and 
biochemistry – to promote patients’ well-being, broadly conceived.  This includes treating and preventing 
illnesses, but can also include enhancing social and cognitive functioning and improving the well-being of 
people whose challenges do not rise to the level of disorders. 
Understanding medicine as the use of biological interventions to promote patient well-being would not 
require abandoning efforts to police doctors’ prescribing powers or to mitigate the harms of drug abuse.  
Instead it would open the door to new ways to regulate drug use and provide clarity regarding the kinds of 
physician conduct that violate drug trafficking laws. 
 
 
INJECTING DOUBT: RESPONDING TO THE NATUROPATHIC ANTI-VACCINATION 
RHETORIC 
Timothy Caulfield, Alessandro R. Marcon*, & Blake Murdoch 
*University of Alberta 
There is growing controversy about vaccination rates in Canada. A significant percentage of the population 
is uncertain about the science of vaccines, and in some areas ‘herd immunity’ is being threatened. 
Hesitancy to vaccinate is a complex phenomenon, but there is little doubt that complementary and 
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alternative medicine (CAM) providers have played a role. In this study, our first objective was to examine 
websites of naturopathic clinics and practitioners in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta, looking 
for (1) the presence of discourse that may contribute to vaccine hesitancy, and (2) recommendations for 
‘alternatives’ to vaccines or flu shots. Of the 330 naturopath websites we analysed, 40 included vaccine 
hesitancy discourse and 26 offered vaccine or flu shot alternatives. Using these data, we explored the 
potential impact such statements could have on the phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy. Our second 
objective was to consider these misrepresentations in the context of Canadian law and policy, and to outline 
various legal methods of addressing them. We concluded that tightening advertising law, reducing CAM 
practitioners’ ability to self-regulate, and improving enforcement of existing common and criminal law 
standards would help limit naturopaths’ ability to spread inaccurate and science-free anti-vaccination and 
vaccine-hesitant perspectives. 
 
 
THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: SYNTHETIC BIOLOGISTS AND THE IDEA OF SELF-
GOVERNANCE. 
Stephen Maurer* 
*Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley 
In the early 2000s most synthetic biologists were confident that their community would develop strong 
private institutions and rules to manage the danger of biological weapons. This paper describes the main 
initiatives – some successful – that academic and commercial biologists organized to achieve this ambition. 
It then asks what these experiences say about the prospect for more ambitious initiatives going forward. I 
close by asking what courts and policymakers can do to promote self-governance, focusing in particular on 
when self-governance should be permissible under the Sherman Act. 
 
 
FAIR DATA SHARING & DATA CARING IN THE DIGITALIZED ERA: 
ASPIRATIONS, REALITIES & LEGAL CLASHES IN THE HEALTH & LIFE 
SCIENCES 
Timo Minssen* 
*University of Copenhagen 
The huge prospects of Big Data, advanced machine learning and AI, as well as the shift to more 
“personalized”, “open” and “transparent” innovation models stress the importance of an effective 
governance, regulation and stimulation of shareable data-applications in the health & life sciences. Yet, 
cutting edge medical innovation requires more than freely available big data and machine-generated data. 
Pushing the boundaries of biomedical research also demands smart data and high quality data that are 
created and nourished through human intervention and considerable investments in an highly competitive 
environment. Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and related rights come into play when data producers 
protect their investment in such data. While the need of recalibrating IPRs to fully support “big and smart 
data” advances is being intensely debated, there seems to be much confusion about the availability of IPRs 
and their legal effects. This presentation provides a very brief overview on selected areas that demonstrate 
emerging tensions at the interface of Big Data, Standardization, IPRs and Competition/Antitrust Law. 
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REFOCUSING ON THE PREGNANT WOMAN IN MATERNAL-FETAL SURGERY: 
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 
Seema Mohapatra* 
*Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law 
In September 2017, a woman agreed to undergo invasive, experimental surgery in an attempt to to lessen 
the physical effects of spina bifida in the fetus she was carrying.1  In this “open” surgery, the surgeon made 
an incision in her abdomen and lifted out her uterus to operate of her fetus.  Her son was born in January, 
and early reports appear to show that the surgery was successful.    Since spina bifida is not a fatal 
condition, the usual practice was to operate at birth, but the results for postnatal surgery were mixed, with 
some children were still unable to walk.2 In the case of so-called “fetal surgery” (the misnomer most 
newspapers used when reporting on this recent case, ignoring the pregnant woman), a physician can 
attempt to fix the defect before birth and prevent damage to the spinal cord from the amniotic fluid.3 
Currently, the ideal time for the surgery is from 24-26 weeks of pregnancy.4 
This Article will survey the maternal-fetal surgery literature from the perspective of the pregnant woman and 
discuss the emerging legal and ethical issues it raises.   Although fetal surgery has been around for over 
thirty years,5 the science is progressing rapidly.  It is probable that maternal-fetal surgery will be attempted 
at earlier points in the pregnancy, pre-viability.  This presents a potential issue in terms of a woman’s right 
to terminate her pregnancy, as well as the physician’s duty towards the woman and the fetus.  This raises 
issues about a woman’s autonomy in decision making and the role of the physician in these interactions.  
Additionally, as these are experimental procedures, this Article will explore how these studies are structured 
(with control groups) and which women are offered (or not offered) these potential surgeries. 
 
 
DECEPTIVELY COMPLICATED 
Jane Campbell Moriarty* 
*Duquesne University School of Law 
This abstract is from a chapter of my book, Are You Lying Now?  Neurotechnology and Law (NYU Press, 
forthcoming 2019). 
The interest in neuroscience lie detection is a new phase of an abiding fascination with both deception and 
the ability to detect lies. The legal system, naturally, has long struggled to determine when individuals are 
telling the truth—at various times relying upon ordeals, torture, oaths, tests, examinations, and occasionally 
polygraph.  We now rely on judges and jurors to determine the credibility of witnesses but there is much 
concern that factfinders can be fooled by clever liars. 
While most of us believe we are essentially honest and value honesty as a virtue, research in various fields 
indicates that most humans lie frequently, spontaneously, and often unconsciously.  Learning to deceive is 
part of childhood development and only those with neurodevelopment disorders do not develop this ability.  
Humans lie about important matters, generally deny that they are deceptive, and engage in self-deception.   
                                                     
 
1 Denise Grady, To Mend a Birth Defect, Surgeons Operate on the Patient Within the Patient, THE NEW YOEK TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/health/fetal-surgery-spina-
bifida.html?action=click&contentCollection=Health&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article. 
2 Denise Grady, To Mend a Birth Defect, Surgeons Operate on the Patient Within the Patient, THE NEW YOEK TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/health/fetal-surgery-spina-
bifida.html?action=click&contentCollection=Health&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article. 
3 Denise Grady, To Mend a Birth Defect, Surgeons Operate on the Patient Within the Patient, THE NEW YOEK TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/health/fetal-surgery-spina-
bifida.html?action=click&contentCollection=Health&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article. 
4 Denise Grady, To Mend a Birth Defect, Surgeons Operate on the Patient Within the Patient, THE NEW YOEK TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/health/fetal-surgery-spina-
bifida.html?action=click&contentCollection=Health&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article. 
5 Anna Smajdor, Ethical Challenges in Fetal Surgery, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 88, 88 (2010). 
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Although we fear our own deception will be revealed, we experience rage upon discovering we’ve been lied 
to.  
Why are we so interested in deception and lie detection?  Drawing on evolutionary psychology, I will address 
whether deception is an essential human trait and whether the ability to detect deception successfully may 
be an evolutionary master key.  
 
 
CAN WE READ YOUR MIND YET? A CRITICAL REPORT ON THE CURRENT 
STATUS OF MEMORY DETECTION 
Emily R.D. Murphy* & Jesse Rissman 
*UC Hastings College of the Law 
Although brain-based memory detection techniques have been used for forensic purposes by police and 
prosecutors in some countries, such as India and Singapore, efforts to promote their more widespread 
adoption have quite appropriately been met with hesitation, given uncertainty about their efficacy and 
reliability. Scientific publications from the past few years report significant advances in empirical evaluations 
of various aspects of memory detection. These studies use a range of methodological approaches including 
fMRI with multi-voxel pattern analysis, EEG, and purely behavioral methods such as the relatively novel 
autobiographical Implicit Association Test. Some of this recent work in memory detection has specifically 
addressed forensically-relevant factors such as the use of real-world acquired memories, classification of 
individuals rather than observation of group differences, and the effect of deployment of evasive 
countermeasures. Moreover, recent publications attempt to independently replicate and verify significant 
findings, lending additional support to the validity of replicated results. In light of advances in the field, the 
time is right for a comprehensive critical appraisal of what these studies tell us about the nature of human 
memory and the viability of memory detection— whether via behavioral or brain-based measures—as a 
forensic tool, and what outstanding issues remain to be addressed. 
 
 
REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING A LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE COURSE 
Roland Nadler* 
*University of Ottawa Centre for Health Law, Policy and Ethics 
Particularly with the advent of the casebook by Jones, Schall, and Shen, professors at law schools and 
elsewhere are increasingly offering classes on issues at the intersection of law and neuroscience. During 
the intensive three-week January term at the University of Ottawa, I taught one such course, in a seminar 
format, to 22 students. My hope is that the experience recounted here yields insights both pedagogical and 
topical.  
Among other highlights, I note: law and neuroscience already offers such a broad menu of weighty topics 
that any reasonable syllabus will necessarily contain some surprising subject-matter omission or another. 
Another observation is that despite efforts to keep things doctrinally grounded, discussion of these issues 
naturally tends toward big-picture legal and philosophical themes. In particular, nearly every session 
touched on challenging, fundamental questions about how to balance democracy and technocracy / 
epistocracy in designing the legal system.  
A final impression concerns the special nature of the brain as contrasted with other sites of legally-relevant 
science and technology: I found that to the extent neuroscience is useful in fostering thoughtful examination 
of law and society, the difference it offers from other varieties of science fiction and science fact seems — 
surprisingly — more like a difference of degree than a difference of kind. My perception in that regard 
challenged my own views — not about the importance of neurolaw, but about the uniqueness of its 
importance.  
 
 
 24 
 
ABORTION LAW FOR 21ST CENTURY DOCTORS 
Michelle Oberman* 
*Santa Clara University School of Law 
In January, 2018, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology issued a position statement opposing 
the punishment of women for self-induced abortion.1 To those unfamiliar with emerging trends in abortion 
in the US and worldwide, the need for the declaration might not be apparent. Several studies suggest that 
self-induced abortion is on the rise here in the US.2 A second trend reveals a rise in the prosecution of 
pregnant women for behavior thought to harm the fetus. The ACOG statement responds to both trends by 
urging doctors to honor the integrity and confidentiality inherent in the doctor-patient relationship. Seen in 
the context of the battle over legal abortion, though, the statement has far broader implications. This paper 
discusses international trends in abortion, legal and illegal, and considers how these trends will affect US 
doctors. 
 
 
REGULATING PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS IN OMIC ASSAYS 
Pilar N. Ossorio* 
*University of Wisconsin Law School and the Morgridge Institute for Research 
Precision medicine will depend on many types of omic assays to help tailor treatments to individual patients.  
Such assays are already helping health care providers to predict a person’s drug responses, characterize 
tumors by their metabolic pathways or gene expression, and better diagnose autoimmune and rare 
diseases.  Complex computational algorithms, including machine learning algorithms, are increasingly 
involved in the operation of omic assays and the analysis of assay results.  While many omic assays have 
been offered as laboratory developed tests (LDTs), some have been regulated by the FDA as in vitro 
diagnostics (IVDs) and more may be in the future.  A leading cancer genome analytics company, 
Foundation Medicine, recently received FDA approval (PMA) for its tumor profiling system, the core of 
which is Foundation Medicine’s algorithm (or algorithms).  The system, now branded as FoundationOne 
CDx, was approved as a companion diagnostic for a variety of chemotherapeutic drugs that treat solid 
tumors of the lung, breast, ovaries, and colon.   
The FDA has long regulated medical software, usually as a component of a medical device but the agency 
will also regulate stand-alone software that meets the regulatory definition of a medical device.  The agency 
regulates devices based on their level of risk, and their level of risk is determined by their intended use.  
Intended use is determined by evaluating objective indicia of the manufacturer’s intent.  The manner in 
which clinicians actually use a device is not evidence of the manufacturer’s intent.  Nonetheless, I argue 
that the agency ought to consider how and whether a device would likely be misused because misuse could 
compromise patient safety and the potential for misuse ought to be considered when classifying a device. 
Here, I will describe the results of a pilot study to elucidate and compare the views of medical algorithm 
developers and clinical oncologists regarding the meaning, strengths, and limitations of assay results 
produced by complex computational algorithms.  Using ethnographic interviews our research team 
assessed each group’s views on what clinicians should know about a test, including its algorithms; what 
testing should occur before an algorithm-driven assay is introduced into clinical use in oncology; what 
limitations different types of algorithms introduce into clinical testing; and related questions.  We have 
identified some areas of concordance and discordance between algorithm developers and clinicians, and 
we identified information about how clinicians understand and use tests that ought to be relevant to the 
FDA.  Our data highlight some technical aspects of algorithm development the FDA might consider when 
                                                     
 
1 https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/Position-Statements/Decriminalization-of-Self-Induced-Abortion 
2 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/opinion/sunday/the-return-of-the-diy-abortion.html?_r=0; Grossman D, White K, Hopkins K, 
Potter JE. The public health threat of anti-abortion legislation. Contraception 2014;89:73-4. 
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classifying algorithm-driven assays or authorizing their marketing.  The data further point to topics on which 
the agency should provide guidance.  Proper guidance could help algorithm developers produce assays 
with a lower likelihood of misuse.  Assays that comport with clinician expectations are less likely to be 
misused or misinterpreted.  The FDA does not directly regulate the practice of medicine but it can regulate 
medical device developers in ways that promote safer medical practice. 
 
 
HOW DO PATENT INCENTIVES AFFECT UNIVERSITY RESEARCHERS? 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette* & Andrew Tutt 
*Stanford Law School 
Universities and other beneficiaries of public funding for scientific research are encouraged to patent 
resulting inventions under the Bayh–Dole Act. This controversial framework gives academic grant recipients 
a direct financial stake in the success of their inventions by requiring universities to share the resulting 
patent royalties with inventors. This incentive for grant recipients might help justify Bayh–Dole patents when 
the conventional justification for exclusivity—that it is necessary for commercialization—fails to hold. But 
there is little evidence as to whether it works. This Article examines how one aspect of the patent incentive—
the prospect of royalties—affects the behavior of university researchers. 
Fortuitously, different universities offer inventors different shares of patent revenue. We have created a 
dataset of royalty-sharing policies from 152 universities, which shows substantial variation across 
universities and time. (For example, Caltech switched from sharing 15% to 25% of net income in 1994, the 
University of Washington switched from sharing 100% of initial revenues to a flat rate of 33% in 2004, and 
the University of Iowa switched from 25% to 100% of initial patent revenues in 2005.) Although prior work 
has suggested that higher royalties for faculty scientists lead to greater licensing income, we do not observe 
this effect in our dataset. We also do not see a significant positive impact of higher faculty shares on 
invention disclosures, patent applications, or issued patents. Additionally, we examined lateral moves by 
the most active patenters between universities, and we did not find that they were more likely to move to 
universities offering higher royalty shares. 
These results do not imply that patents provide no incentives to university researchers; they may provide 
reputational benefits or encourage faculty-run spin-offs, or even provide financial incentives that are not 
captured by our statistics. But the lack of a strong impact of higher royalty shares on the behavior one would 
expect to be most affected—creation of more and more valuable patents—suggests that, from a social 
welfare perspective, it may be preferable for a larger share of royalties to be retained by universities, which 
are then required by Bayh–Dole to reinvest this money in science research and education. In any event, 
our analysis raises promising questions for future research and calls into question the existing view that 
increasing the inventor’s share in university patent policies encourages researchers to develop and 
commercialize more remunerative patents. 
 
 
WHOLE EXOME SEQUENCING IN THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM: LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL ISSUES 
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Efthimios Parasidis*, Mauricio De Castro, Cubby Gardner, Megan D. 
Maxwell, Amy McGuire, & Robert C. Green 
*The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and the College of Public Health 
The MilSeq Project is a pilot study exploring the implementation of personalized medicine into the United 
States Air Force (USAF) through whole exome sequencing in apparently healthy, active-duty Airmen. 
Drawing on study design and implementation of the MilSeq Project, the proposed presentation will examine 
legal and ethical issues surrounding whole exome sequencing in the military health system. Topics include 
solicitation of research participants, informed consent, privacy and confidentiality, and how to assess, 
disclose, and manage the potential for adverse career impact. 
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Disclaimers 
This material is based on research sponsored by Air Force Medical Support Agency, Research and 
Acquisition Directorate AFMSA/SG5 under cooperative agreement number FA8650-17-2-6704. The U.S. 
Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding 
any copyright notation thereon. 
The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as 
necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of Air Force 
Medical Support Agency, Research and Acquisition Directorate AFMSA/SG5 or the U.S. Government. 
The voluntary, fully informed consent of the subjects used in this research was obtained as required by 32 
CFR 219 and AFI 40-402, Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 
 
 
SOCIAL SAFETY NETS AND GENETIC ANTI-DISCRIMINATION IN PRIVATE LIFE 
AND INCOME REPLACEMENT INSURANCE 
Anya Prince* 
*University of Iowa College of Law 
Insurer use of genetic information has long been debated in the US and around the world. Although federal 
law prohibits health insurers from underwriting on the basis of genetic information, it does not address use 
by life, long-term care, and disability insurers. The debate in this area continues, highlighting tensions 
between social fairness concerns and the economic concerns of the insurance industry. The US, however, 
is not alone in its struggle to balance between business and social considerations. What can the US learn 
from the policies other countries have adopted to regulate insurer use of genetic information? This 
presentation will build on previous comparison work done on international policies, but specifically consider 
how a country’s social safety net program affects the landscape of regulation of private life or income 
replacement insurers. On the one hand, outside the context of health insurance, the economic and social 
considerations of private, individually-written insurers is similar across countries. On the other, government 
programs in health, death benefits, and income replacement benefits alters, not just societies’ attitudes 
towards solidarity, but also the potential impact of regulating insurer use of new technologies, such as big 
data and genetic test results. 
 
 
FORENSIC BIOBANKING 
Natalie Ram* 
*University of Baltimore School of Law 
In March 2015, New Orleans filmmaker Michael Usry found himself the target of a police investigation 
stemming from a partial match between DNA left at a 1996 murder scene and Usry’s father’s DNA. Usry’s 
father had submitted his DNA years earlier to a private laboratory for genealogical research. That 
laboratory’s assets had subsequently been acquired by Ancestry.com, which made the database of 
genealogical genetic data publicly available. Investigators compared their crime scene DNA to the 
Ancestry.com database—of which Usry’s father was a part—and discovered that the father was a close, 
but imperfect, match to the crime scene DNA. That match excluded Usry’s father as a suspect but 
suggested that a close relative might have committed the crime. Based on the partial match, police began 
to investigate Usry, eventually securing a warrant for his DNA. Ultimately, Usry was cleared as a suspect 
when his DNA proved not to be a match for the crime scene DNA. 
At present, little is known about whether and how criminal investigations gain access to genetic data held 
in clinical, research, and commercial biobanks. This paper investigates law enforcement use of genetic 
biobanks. First, it demonstrates that law enforcement access to and searches in genetic data held in 
biobanks is problematic, particularly in light of traditional bioethics principles, practical considerations 
concerning access to health care and participation in research, and criminal justice norms about who 
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properly ought to be subject to genetic identification through database search. Second, it details the panoply 
of legal sources that play a role in authorizing or constraining access to genetic resources, identifying 
multiple variables that impact privacy protection from forensic search. Third, it analyzes the complex 
interactions among these dimensions of variability to expose gaps in biobank privacy protection against law 
enforcement access—and identifies how these privacy gaps can most efficiently be remedied. 
 
 
REGULATING THE DEAD: FROM PAST TO PRESENT 
Alix Rogers* 
*Stanford Law School 
Under contemporary American law most human corpses and some bodily parts are classified as quasi-
property.  Quasi-property is an American legal conception composed of limited interests that mimic some 
of the functions of property. It is a uniquely American idiosyncratic legal category that, while dismissed by 
many as a legal fiction, persists to this day.  But where did quasi-property come from, and why did American 
courts ascribe quasi-property status to human remains?  The question is particularly intriguing because 
quasi-property status broke with hundreds of years of inherited common law.  Traditional explanations point 
to America's lack of ecclesiastical courts, which historically had jurisdiction over cemeteries and burial in 
England.1  But historical examination reveals that this explanation does not sufficiently account for the initial 
application, dominance or persistence of the unique status of quasi-property.  This paper argues that socio-
cultural changes forged in the maelstrom of the Civil War precipitated the initial use and later systematic 
adoption by American courts of quasi-property status for human remains.  Analysis of the rise of quasi-
property in human remains at the turn of the nineteenth century is particularly significant because the nature 
of quasi-property rights in human remains is contentious and unsettled in contemporary legal analysis.  
Consequently, historical examination of the impetuses to its original application can shed new light on this 
contemporary debate.   
 
 
IP PREPAREDNESS 
Ana Santos Rutschman* 
*DePaul University College of Law 
This Article introduces the concept of, and a framework for, intellectual property preparedness for outbreak 
diseases.  
Through case studies on recent outbreaks (including Ebola and Zika in 2014-16), the Article begins by 
surveying the role of IP in responding to infectious diseases from the pre-outbreak to the post-outbreak 
stages. It identifies three types of IP inefficiencies that have historically affected this response: R&D failures, 
hold-up of pre-existing IP and licensing of emerging IP against the public interest. Cumulatively, these 
different types of inefficiencies have led to a recurring lack of IP preparedness—an ill-calibration of separate 
yet interacting features of the patent system—to respond effectively to infectious disease outbreaks. 
The Article then turns to solutions to increase our IP preparedness for future outbreaks. In addition to new 
incentives streams, IP preparedness requires innovative legal measures to mitigate IP-related 
inefficiencies. The Article surveys existing mechanisms that can help accomplish this goal and lays out the 
ground for a new mechanism—a dormant license—to mitigate transactional IP inefficiencies when an 
outbreak occurs. 
 
 
                                                     
 
1 Tanya K. Hernandez, “The Property of Death,” University of Pittsburg Law Review 69 (1999): 971; P.D.G. Skegg, “Human Corpses, 
Medical Specimens and the Law of Property,” Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 4 (1975): 412–425. 
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DELINKING REIMBURSEMENT 
Rachel E. Sachs* 
*Washington University in St. Louis School of Law 
Over the past few years, calls for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to approve pharmaceuticals 
more speedily have grown louder. At the same time, many have argued that America’s drug pricing 
problems can be solved if only Congress gave Medicare the authority to negotiate drug prices. But scholars 
and policymakers have largely missed the linkage between these arguments. The FDA’s regulatory system 
cannot be meaningfully changed without affecting the amount spent on pharmaceuticals, and Medicare’s 
authority to negotiate drug prices depends on the FDA. This is true for a simple reason: FDA approval is 
often linked by law to insurance coverage. Insurers must cover most, if not all, FDA-approved drugs.  
This Article first explains the link between FDA approval and insurance coverage, describing a range of 
insurance programs and analyzing what drugs they are legally required to cover. The Article then considers 
how the link between FDA approval and insurance reimbursement affects policy choices. For instance, 
proposals that would require the FDA to approve drugs on the basis of less robust evidence would result in 
the approval of more unsafe, ineffective drugs—and Medicare and Medicaid would need to cover all of 
them. Alterations to the FDA approval system without altering reimbursement requirements would increase 
costs, not decrease them.  
The Article then envisions what the implications might be for both innovation and access if approval and 
reimbursement were delinked. There are at least three potential policy consequences, although their 
precise reach undoubtedly depends on the scope of delinkage. First, there would be some reduction in 
access to these medicines. If Medicare and Medicaid are not legally required to cover certain drugs, they 
will no longer choose to. But second, if companies know that they must earn coverage, perhaps by 
demonstrating efficacy over competitors, they may innovate in more socially valuable ways. Third, 
delinkage of this type would help address the drug pricing problem, precisely because of both of the above 
considerations.  
Further empirical analysis will be needed before we can conclude as a policy matter that the benefits of 
delinkage outweigh the costs. But it ought to be part of the conversation, as it has the potential to address 
some of our innovation and pricing concerns while imposing minimal access constraints.  
 
 
FRACKING HEALTH CARE: HOW TO SAFELY DE-MEDICALIZE AMERICA AND 
RECOVER TRAPPED VALUE FOR ITS PEOPLE 
William M. Sage* 
*School of Law and Dell Medical School, The University of Texas at Austin 
Call it the trillions that time forgot. Shining fortresses filled with gold and teeming with human activity dot 
the American landscape. Within them, much is produced to benefit the nation. Overseers enjoy prestige 
and prosperity, and minions security and purpose. Outside their gates, society’s reverence is made tangible 
by regular custom and lavish tribute. 
These fortresses are not feudal castles, grand cathedrals, or even great universities. They are emphatically 
not churning factories, although they are businesses. They are America’s hospitals and clinics—the 
industrial engines of U.S. health care.1 And most are both out of time and out of place. 
Pushing $4 trillion annually, and employing millions of people in most communities in every state, health 
care represents one-sixth of the American economy.2 Only the automobile industry in its heyday during the 
                                                     
 
1 See ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 40–46, 
351–52 (1999) (asserting that not-for-profit hospitals have been profit-maximizing enterprises). 
2 Sean P. Keehan et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2016–25: Price Increases, Aging Push Sector To 20 Percent of 
Economy, 36 HEALTH AFF. 3553 (2017). 
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1950s and 1960s rivaled modern health care’s centrality to peacetime domestic production and 
employment.3 
In 2017, large economic sectors tend to share common features.4 Ownership is separated from control. 
Goods and capital move freely. Production is global and automated. Entry barriers have dropped. Products 
come assembled. Prices are low, as is inflation. Consumers matter. On the downside, domestic 
employment has slowed, and the rewards of production accrue mainly to senior executives and wealthy 
investors.5 
Health care is different, a throwback.6 Ownership is either captive to or fused with control. Capital is 
hindered both entering and leaving. Entry barriers are substantial, even as consolidation accelerates. 
Technology seldom increases productivity. Trade is restricted and little production occurs offshore. 
Products are offered piecemeal at high and rising prices, often paid by intermediaries with faint consumer 
voice. But job growth is pronounced, and the artisanal and managerial classes prosper. Only higher 
education seems remotely similar, though (reproductive rights aside) health care has for the most part been 
spared parallel accusations of secular elitism. 
Health care’s privileged status imposes an unacceptable social cost. Sheltered by conscious if incremental 
public policy—including selective subsidies, entry restrictions, tax preferences, and protectionist 
professional self-governance—an estimated $1 trillion each year is sacrificed in care that is overpriced, 
wasteful, useless, or harmful.7 At the same time, inattention to poverty, lack of education, and other “social 
determinants” of health compromises economic productivity and civic engagement, and adds substantially 
to the nation’s medical bill.8 
But there is more to this story than a plea for deregulation and the efficiency gains that would accompany 
it. The wealth trapped within American health care is simultaneously a tragedy and a miracle. It is a tragedy 
because stagnating wages, widening disparities in income, ballooning deficits, and stunted investments in 
education and social services make such medical profligacy shameful. It is a miracle because it still exists, 
whereas other resources of similar magnitude have already been dissipated without addressing any of the 
aforementioned failings—indeed, sometimes having contributed to them. It therefore can be released and 
used. 
It is time to “frack” the health care system and innovate the de- medicalization of America. The catchphrase 
for this effort is assuredly not “Repeal and Replace,” the Republican party’s oversimplified solution to the 
overblown criticism it continues to level against the Affordable Care Act. A better mantra is “Recover and 
Repurpose”—releasing the value trapped in our underperforming health care system and directing it toward 
more individually and socially productive ends. Significantly, this turns out to be a more complex and 
contextual project than putting one’s faith in freedom and markets, although freedom and markets play a 
central role. 
With careful planning and responsible execution, recovering and repurposing the trillions of dollars being 
spent on low-value medicine can set an example for policy-makers of an economic transition that offers 
broad distributive and communal benefits as well as efficiency gains. The current condition of American 
3 Transportation in 1965 and health care in 1995 were similar in several ways: same shares of GDP, shares of employment, degrees 
of private control, high rates of avoidable death, and cultures of individual responsibility. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. 
HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 50 (1990) (describing the cultural and economic power of the auto industry during 
its heyday). 
4 For a persuasive description of globalization, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005). 
5 For an analysis of economic inequality and wage stagnation, see THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(2014). 
6 Cf. Susan Dentzer, It’s Past Time to Get Serious About Transforming Care, 32 HEALTH AFF. 6, 6 (2013) (“One eternal mystery of 
US health care is why patients and payers have been loath to demand attributes they take for granted in other sectors of the economy, 
such as convenience, price transparency, and reasonable costs.”). 
7 INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 38 
(Mark Smith et al. eds., 2013). 
8 See generally ELIZABETH H. BRADLEY & LAUREN A. TAYLOR, THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PARADOX: WHY SPENDING 
MORE IS GETTING US LESS (2015) (discussing US lack of social investment); RICHARD COOPER, POVERTY AND THE MYTHS 
OF HEALTH CARE 
REFORM (2016) (arguing that poverty, not clinical uncertainty, explains geographic variations in health care); Raj Chetty et al., The 
Association between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014, 315 JAMA 1750 (2016). 
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politics compels such an approach. Cast in its best light, the cleavage revealed by the 2016 election cycle 
was not between the individual and the collective, or even between choice and coercion, but between re-
invention and restoration. Moreover, the restorative forces made it clear that becoming “great again” meant 
recapturing many of the qualities that health care aberrantly if expensively has retained: jobs, nativism, 
regional fairness, paternalism, and trust. 
 
 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY  
Julie Seaman* 
*Emory University School of Law 
Since the birth and exponential growth of the Internet over the past two decades, a rapidly growing 
theoretical and experimental literature has sprung up and begun to study the effects of the online 
environment. With the emergence of the field of cyberpsychology over the past decade, as well as several 
academic journals solely devoted to computer mediated communication (CMC), the complex universe of 
the online social brain has begun to reveal itself. While much of this space is thus far only roughly mapped 
and much else is yet to be discovered, there are a number of preliminary findings that have implications for 
thinking about freedom of speech on the Internet. The nature and effects of disinhibition online, the effect 
of online social communication on memory and belief about facts and events in the physical world, the 
drivers of antisocial behaviors such as flaming, shaming, and trolling, the proliferation of gender-based 
online aggression, and the so-called “filter bubble” effect and its relation to social and political polarization 
are all fertile ground for analysis and further research as they relate to First Amendment theory, doctrine, 
and values. 
In this essay, we hazard our first and very tentative steps into this varied and treacherous terrain at the 
crossroads of the First Amendment, social media, and human behavior. We proceed from an 
interdisciplinary perspective, considering research in various subfields of psychology, anthropology, and 
political science. Our overall framework, however, draws on the evolutionary science of group dynamics 
and cooperation, which has much to say about how individuals behave within groups, how groups behave 
with respect to other groups, and the features that can make some groups successful, constructive, 
egalitarian, and prosocial while others are destructive, hierarchical, violent, and antisocial. In particular, we 
draw on the Nobel Prize-winning work of Elinor Ostrom regarding the eight fundamental design principles 
that underlie successful group management of common resources and the extension of that work to other 
types of groups trying to accomplish other goals. We then explore the implications of these ideas as they 
relate to groups that operate in cyberspace.  
 
 
BLUEPRINT FOR A NEUROLAW CLINIC 
Francis X. Shen* 
*University of Minnesota Law School 
Legal scholarship at the intersection of neuroscience and law is rapidly increasing. But at present, the 
practical implications of neurolaw remain mostly speculative. I argue in this article that this is large part 
because we do not (yet) have a mechanism by which students can be taught how advances in neuroscience 
(and related fields) can be readily integrated into real legal cases. Thus, I develop here a “Blueprint for a 
Neurolaw Clinic.” In Part I, the Article discusses the rationale and benefits of a Neurolaw Clinic. I discuss 
how a Neurolaw Clinic would operate differently than traditional clinics. Rather than take a single case from 
start to finish, a Neurolaw Clinic would work collaboratively with the Law School’s existing clinics. Part II 
presents seven use cases, highlighting ways in which a Neurolaw Clinic could enhance existing clinical 
work in: (1) juvenile justice, (2) criminal defense, (3) civil litigation, (4) immigration, (5) family law, (6) elder 
law, and (7) domestic violence. Part III addresses a series of critiques and design considerations. I argue 
that ideally a Neurolaw Clinic would be part of a larger Law and Biosciences Clinic, with additional expertise 
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in related bioscience fields. Part IV concludes, arguing that the Law School that moves first to create a 
Neurolaw Clinic will reap significant dividends. 
 
 
GENETIC DATA, TRADE SECRETS, AND PUBLIC RESEARCH: ADAPTIVE 
IMMUNORECEPTOR REPERTOIRE PROJECTS 
Jacob S. Sherkow* 
*New York Law School 
The human immune system is dynamically adaptive: it responds, on the fly, to unknown and unforeseen 
foreign invaders through the regulation of gene expression in a variety of cell types. In particular, 
“immunoreceptors”—complex proteins attached to B- and T-cells—attach to foreign material, i.e., 
“antigens,” and signal the immune system to respond. The repertoire of these immunoreceptors is 
galactically diverse. Each individual possesses billions of different immunoreceptors, each binding to its 
own antigen; across humanity, the number of different possible immunoreceptors likely numbers into the 
trillions. 
Recent high-throughput gene sequencing technology has now made it possible to sequence the entirety of 
an individuals immunoreceptor repertoire. Scientists from around the globe are now working in concert to 
understand the diversity and function of the “adaptive immunoreceptor repertoire,” or AIRR. But the 
enormous volumes of data produced by such projects raise difficult questions concerning trade secrecy. 
Some data within such AIRR repositories may be incredibly valuable in the development of human 
therapeutics. Researchers have accordingly struggled with whether, how, and to what extent, such 
information must be disclosed to the public or whether such information, in some circumstances, can be 
preserved as a trade secret. This is all the more complicated given the global nature of such efforts: an 
AIRR research group frequently spans multiple jurisdictions, with varying rules regarding trade secrecy, 
patenting, and researchers’ responsibilities to release their data. 
This chapter will briefly recount the science concerning AIRR and community efforts to regulate it by private 
governance, namely, the community AIRR project, or CAIRR. The chapter will then provide an overview of 
differences in trade secret protection for research data across several jurisdictions where such research is 
taking place, including the Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. And the chapter 
will conclude by suggesting best practices for implementing trade secrecy for cross-border AIRR projects. 
 
 
CONTEXTUALIZING THE INFORMATION-FACILITATING FUNCTION OF PATENTS 
THROUGHOUT THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS 
Brenda M. Simon* 
*Thomas Jefferson School of Law 
Patents are often critical to facilitating information exchange during the innovative process, yet their role 
has not been clearly articulated. Traditional understanding of the role of patents in enabling the exchange 
of information has focused primarily on entities in two industries— biotechnology and software. This Article 
seeks to provide a more complete account of the disclosure-enabling function of patents throughout the 
innovative process by providing a richer account of a critical, yet often-overlooked area—the medical device 
industry—by evaluating existing literature and describing the results of a series of interviews conducted 
with medical device professionals from small and medium sized firms. In addition to considering the 
perspective of inventors, which has often been the focus of recent scholarship, this Article also sets forth 
the viewpoint of investors and commercialization partners. The medical device industry can operate as a 
barometer of how well the patent system in general is functioning in accordance with its historic purpose—
to promote progress through innovation. 
Patents may play a very different role in the initial stages of discussion with prospective investors than 
during later attempts to structure commercialization alliances. The extent to which patents encourage the 
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exchange of information about an invention by mitigating the risk of expropriation depends on many 
considerations. For example, the nature of the invention, relationship between the parties, and whether the 
inventors can retain tacit knowledge essential to executing the invention and disclose information in stages 
can affect how patent protection enables information exchange. In the medical device industry, for example, 
innovators seeking to protect traditional mechanical inventions from expropriation may depend on different 
mechanisms than they might otherwise use to protect devices that have a strong software or data-
generating component. 
The function of patents in encouraging information exchange between potential partners during the later 
stages of coordinating commercialization is similarly highly-contextual. For companies that are not 
integrated, patents can provide a mechanism to allow for increased scaling and coordination with 
commercialization partners, providing greater flexibility in determining organizational structure and 
mitigating the risks of expropriation. From the perspective of potential commercialization partners, patents 
can provide reassurance against expropriation risks by unrelated parties. The availability of patent 
protection may also promote synergistic exchanges of information in the development process. As an 
example, in the medical device field, over 80 percent of companies have fewer than 50 employees, they 
frequently rely on alliances to manufacture and market their products, and their commercialization partners 
rely on intellectual property to prevent expropriation by third parties. 
By providing a descriptive timeline of the innovative process through a closer examination of the largely 
overlooked medical device industry, this Article sets forth a more complete account of the circumstances in 
which patents may enable information exchange and when they may be less necessary, elucidating the 
larger narrative of innovation and the role of patents in it. 
 
 
GINA AND EDITED GENOMES 
Andrew W. Torrance* 
*University of Kansas School of Law 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) became law on May 21, 2008. In the decade since, 
it has changed the way employers and health insurers operate because it forbids their use of genetic 
information from individuals in making decisions concerning employment or insurance coverage of those 
individuals. Approximately 200 disputes arising from GINA have led to litigation yielding published opinions. 
These range from the mundane, such as disputes over asking employees for their family medical histories, 
to the profane, such as the mysterious case of the “devious defecator”. All of these disputes have involved 
information preëxisting in unaltered “natural” genomes. With the advent of gene editing, the prospect of 
GINA’s application to edited genomes presents itself. This article provides an introduction to gene editing, 
particularly in humans, explores how relevant GINA may be to the protection of the privacy of genetic 
information derived from edited genomes, and offers perspectives on whether and how GINA might be 
amended to achieve its original goals of genetic nondiscrimination. 
 
 
CHANGING THE COMPANY TO CHANGE THE RESULTS:  APPLICATION TO THE 
OPIOID EPIDEMIC 
Liza Vertinsky* & Yaniv Heled 
*Emory University School of Law 
There is increasing evidence that the current levels of opioid use and abuse can be attributed at least in 
part to actions take by pharmaceutical companies seeking to maximize their returns on sales of opioids 
(and now on antidotes to overdoses of opioids).   Many of these corporate actions are not illegal, and those 
activities that might run afoul of the law involve behavior that is difficult to detect and monitor.   In an earlier 
paper we have documented the pervasive disconnect between private incentives and public needs in 
healthcare markets, and we have argued that healthcare companies should be strongly incentivized, if not 
required, to be(come) benefit corporations in order to inject the public interest more directly into corporate 
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decision making.   We now show how such a measure could be used to more effectively address and curtail 
the corporate abuses that have contributed to the current opioid epidemic.    
The article begins with a study of corporate contributions to the abuse of opioids in the U.S.  It focuses on 
the incentive structures that have propelled companies into the business of mass marketing opioids through 
a variety of channels extending far beyond direct advertising, along with the market structure that allows 
and even facilitates such corporate strategies.   It goes on to examine current measures to enforce reforms, 
including law suits by the attorney generals in a number of states and some modest efforts at internal 
corporate reforms in the shadow of such lawsuits.   It concludes by examining the limitations of existing 
approaches and the opportunities for a more effective response through change in the corporate form itself.   
 
 
DATA ACCESS POLICIES AS A RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY 
Jennifer K. Wagner* 
*Center for Translational Bioethics & Health Care Policy, Geisinger 
Introduction: The meaning and contours of the “loss of chance” doctrine in the context of precision 
medicine are nebulous at best. Precision health initiatives launched by health providing organizations 
enable biomedical researchers (who often do not provide health care services personally and are not 
licensed to do so) to conduct broad discovery research involving examination of electronic health records, 
whole genome or exome sequencing data, and nontraditional “health data” sources to address social and 
environmental determinants of health along with biological determinants. These initiatives sometimes return 
of genomic results deemed by the institution or researchers to be “medically actionable” back to the patient-
participants and their doctors. Genetic professionals have long been concerned about legal liability, 
including liability risks that might attach when decisions are made to return or, alternatively, withhold data 
or results from individuals to whom those pertain. Labs do not routinely reanalyze data or recontact 
individuals with updated information as genomic science and technology advance, and there is general 
consensus that researchers do not have duties to look for or report all findings to participants. Nevertheless, 
when broad genomic research is conducted where participants are also patients and when institutional 
policy or research protocol stipulates data or results will be withheld (regardless of rationale), there are 
concerns about when and how individuals might ultimately learn this information and whether the discovery 
will be too late to avoid (1) the progression of a condition for which prevention or treatment was available 
or (2) unnecessary harms such as ineffective treatments for which substitutes were available. The loss of 
chance doctrine is a legal theory available in some states that, in the context of medical malpractice, 
enables a plaintiff to recover from a defendant whose breach of duty reduced the chance of a favorable 
outcome (such as a delayed diagnosis or treatment resulting in diminished chance of recovery or survival). 
There is a paucity of critical analysis of this legal doctrine, despite acknowledgment by some of its relevance 
to the genetics field. Even the American Law Institute has not yet taken a firm position, despite the doctrine’s 
first court appearance 50 years ago. The ELSI community has been fixated on the preliminary issue of 
whether researchers have a duty to return genomic results to participants. Its general consensus that 
researchers generally do not have a legally recognized obligation to return data and results to research 
participants is an important one; nevertheless, it does not settle the legal inquiry. Methods: Using the 
WestlawNext® legal database, a systematic search of cases invoking the “loss of chance” doctrine was 
performed. Of the search results, cases that had occurred in jurisdictions served by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit (i.e., Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and U.S. Virgin Islands) were 
further analyzed using standard legal research methodologies. Results: A total of 872 cases involving the 
“loss of chance” doctrine was identified, including 605 reported and 267 unreported cases. Among them 
were 185 federal and 687 state cases (of which 99 and 506 were reported, respectively). Seventy (or 8%) 
of the cases identified were located in jurisdictions of interest and further analyzed. No cases were decided 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, or Virgin Islands District Court. 
Forty-one of the 70 cases subjected to further examination (or 59%) were reported, with 19 in PA, 33 in NJ, 
and 19 in DE. Discussion: This preliminary legal analysis revealed that the “loss of chance” doctrine is 
poorly understood, inconsistently articulated, and manifested differently across jurisdictions within the 
medical malpractice context. In light of the legal uncertainty and given the perceived burdens making 
ongoing reanalysis and recontact of all genomic research patient-participants infeasible, the adoption of 
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institutional policies to provide patient-participants with prompt and full genomic data access—regardless 
of whether those data are CLIA-generated or confirmed—as a risk mitigation strategy is an attractive option 
worthy of consideration.  
Conflicts of Interest:  The author has no conflicts of interest to disclose for this work.  
Acknowledgments:  This research was supported in part by NHGRI Grant No. R00HG006446. The 
content is solely the author’s responsibility and does not represent the official views of Geisinger or the 
NHGRI.  
Note:  I presented some of this work as a poster at the 2017 ASHG Annual Meeting in Orlando, FL; 
however, I’m eager to obtain critiques and suggestions from my Bio-Law colleagues on how I can improve 
my analysis (which to date has been admittedly basic) and develop a more sophisticated understanding 
and discussion so that the work is worthy of publication. I particularly am seeking discussion regarding how 
to examine institutional obligations to patient-participants.    
 
 
ACCESS TO PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING FOR PERSONS EXPERIENCING MENTAL 
DISORDERS OR PSYCHOLOGIST DISTRESS: A LEGAL AND BIOETHICAL 
ANALYSIS 
Lois A. Weithorn* 
*UC Hastings College of Law 
At the time of this writing, six states and the District of Columbia permit individuals to receive physician 
assistance in hastening death under limited circumstances. In 1997, after overcoming multiple legal 
challenges, Oregon’s statute became the first such law to go into effect in the U.S. Over a decade later, 
Washington followed. Eventually, four more jurisdictions (Vermont, California, Colorado, and the District of 
Columbia) enacted physician aid in dying legislation. Montana’s Supreme Court legalized physician aid in 
dying in 2009. 
There is substantial similarity among the statutory frameworks in imposing significant restrictions on 
patients’ access to state-authorized aid in dying. For example, the statutes condition eligibility on medical 
certification that the patient has a “terminal” medical condition with a life expectancy of no more than six 
months. The patient must be judged to be “competent” to make this decision and physically capable of self-
administering the lethal prescription. 
In addition to a determination of competence, some statutes, such as California’s, also require that the 
evaluating physician refer the patient to a mental health professional for assessment “[i]f If there are 
indications of a mental disorder…”1 While additional language in California’s statutes suggests that the role 
of the mental health assessment is to provide further elucidation about questions of the patient’s 
competence and a determination that “the individual is not suffering from impaired judgment due to a mental 
disorder,” 2  there remains a lack of clarity as to the effect that a diagnosis of a mental disorder or 
psychological symptomatology has on patient eligibility. One interpretation suggests that if a patient meets 
legal criteria for competence to make treatment decisions,3 other psychological factors are not pertinent to 
one’s eligibility for such assistance. Alternatively, a broader construction of the concept of “impaired 
judgment” may exclude some persons who meet technical competence standards. 
This talk will briefly analyze the legal, bioethical, and psychological issues related to eligibility for physician 
aid in dying of persons with mental disorders and other forms of psychological distress. It will address 
current debates about the impact of mental disorder on decisional competence, particularly in the context 
                                                     
 
1 Cal. Health & Safety Code §443.7(d) (2018). 
2 Cal. Health & Safety Code §443.8(c) (2018). 
3 Empirical research published in the 1990s and thereafter has provided powerful evidence to help counter an assumption that persons 
with mental disorders are categorically incompetent to make treatment decisions. Yet, the line between competence and incompetence 
is not always clear, particularly when the stakes of a determination are as dramatic as life or death. 
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of end of life decisionmaking. The author will close with recommendations regarding application of physician 
aid in dying statutes to persons diagnosed with mental disorders or serious psychological distress.4 
 
 
RISKS AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS IN LARGE-SCALE GENE-ENVIRONMENT 
INTERACTION STUDIES 
Leslie E. Wolf* 
*Georgia State University College of Law 
Large-scale gene-environment interaction studies, such as the Precision Medicine Initiative, offer 
unparalleled, innovative opportunities to learn more about human health and disease, but raise critical 
concerns about protections against research risks. Traditional approaches to protecting research 
participants may not address new or heightened risks in the “big data” era, and the strengths and weakness 
of the “web” of protections federal and state laws create is poorly understood. Moreover, emerging models 
that cede control to participants over whether, with whom, and for what purposes their data are shared may 
fall outside some of these protections.  
Our legal research elucidates the web of legal protections, including laws governing human subjects 
research, privacy, consent, discrimination, and use of research participants’ genetic information. It has 
revealed substantial regulatory activity and variation across the 50 states that may fill gaps in federal 
protections.  For example, some states go further than the Genetic Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) by 
extending genetic antidiscrimination statutes to life and disability insurers or to employers with less than 15 
employees. In addition, states often explicitly provide remedies, such as statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, 
and costs that can facilitate enforcement of legal rights not afforded in federal laws. This state activity can 
strengthen the rights and protections afforded to some participants, but can leave other participants 
unprotected simply because of where they live, entered the study, or where their data was collected or 
stored.   
Note: This presentation comes out of funded research (NIH R01‐HG‐007733, PI: Laura Beskow) in 
collaboration with colleagues at Duke University. The Georgia State team leads the legal analysis and also 
includes Professor Erin Fuse Brown, as well as our excellent GRAs. 
 
 
STATE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS DRUG-PRICING CONTROVERSIES 
Rebecca E. Wolitz* 
*Stanford Law School 
Public ire over the high costs of pharmaceuticals is well-known. Members of Congress and the new 
administration both have stated that this issue merits attention. However, in an uncertain federal 
environment and with lingering questions about the authority and expertise of federal agencies to address 
drug- pricing controversies, it is important to consider the role of states. 
States have, in fact, been taking matters into their own hands. State legislative activity has surged on this 
issue. States from California and Nevada in the West to Maryland and New York in the East are 
experimenting with new bills and laws to address drug-pricing controversies. 
                                                     
 
4 This work is an outgrowth of the author’s consulting relationship with the Center for AIDS Prevention Studies, University of California, 
San Francisco. An earlier presentation examined implications of California’s End of Life Options Act for persons living with HIV. My 
research revealed that the most salient factor needing attention for such persons relates to the psychological distress and psychosocial 
isolation experienced by many long-term survivors of HIV. Some of these individuals, stable on antiretroviral therapy for decades, 
choose to stop taking their medications in order to meet the six-month life expectancy requirement of the statutes and receive physician 
assistance to hasten death. Such cases have proven challenging for those applying the statutes. 
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Yet, despite how they are often discussed, drug-pricing controversies appear to have different underlying 
causes and consequently implicate different kinds of policy considerations. And, interestingly, close 
inspection of recent state efforts reveals that states have different kinds of controversies in their crosshairs. 
Among others, state proposals have included increasing pricing transparency, regulating drug prices, and 
limiting costs through restrictions on payment. Some of these efforts have a specific focus—for instance on 
a specific disease type or on generics. 
These observations lead to two important and fundamental questions: First, what role can states play with 
respect to addressing drug-pricing controversies? Second, what role ought states to play with respect to 
addressing drug-pricing controversies? 
This paper will tackle these broader legal and normative questions by focusing on a subset of issues, 
including the narrower issue of state price regulation of patented pharmaceuticals. With respect to the legal 
issue of whether states have the legal ability to regulate the prices of patented medications, there is 
currently one precedent directly on point: Biotechnology Industry Organization v. D.C., 496 F.3d 1362 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). This Federal Circuit case considered the District of Columbia’s Excessive Pricing Act and 
ultimately deemed the Act to be conflict preempted. As will be argued, this ruling is questionable for a 
number of reasons. 
Whatever one thinks about the legal questions, however, normative questions remain. Particularly given 
the intersection of drug-pricing controversies with issues of innovation policy and consumer access, what 
role ought states to play in addressing drug-pricing controversies? After taking account of legal ability and 
authority, how should we begin to think about the appropriate role of federal versus state efforts in this 
space? This paper will explore and address these crucial questions. 
 
 
GOOD GATEKEEPING 
Patricia J. Zettler*, Margaret Foster Riley, & Aaron S. Kesselheim 
*Georgia State University College of Law 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) requires authorization from FDA to market various 
products, including new drugs for humans and non-human animals, many devices, and new tobacco 
products.  Although the precise standards for marketing authorization for product categories differs, 
common to the FDA’s gatekeeping role for each is a weighing of the products’ risks and benefits.  Yet, in 
part because the FDCA defines drugs, devices, and tobacco products quite broadly, this weighing of risks 
and benefits is done for products with very different characteristics—including products traditionally 
understood to be therapeutic and subject to FDA gatekeeping (e.g., cancer drugs), products intended for 
enhancement (e.g., non-invasive devices used for cognitive enhancement), and “vice” products used for 
recreation (e.g., vaping products or recreational marijuana).  This project explores how the FDA has 
interpreted the statutory standards for marketing authorization for products with such different kinds of risks 
and benefits.  It draws on relevant FDA and administrative law literature and caselaw to analyze the extent 
to which the FDA can and should interpret its gatekeeping role as being the same or different for therapeutic, 
enhancement, and vice products, regardless of whether such products are drugs, devices, or tobacco 
products. 
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